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Abstract
Gradient Boosting Decision Trees (GBDTs) have become
very successful in recent years, with many awards in machine
learning and data mining competitions. There have been sev-
eral recent studies on how to train GBDTs in the federated
learning setting. In this paper, we focus on horizontal feder-
ated learning, where data samples with the same features are
distributed among multiple parties. However, existing studies
are not efficient or effective enough for practical use. They
suffer either from the inefficiency due to the usage of costly
data transformations such as secret sharing and homomorphic
encryption, or from the low model accuracy due to differen-
tial privacy designs. In this paper, we study a practical feder-
ated environment with relaxed privacy constraints. In this en-
vironment, a dishonest party might obtain some information
about the other parties’ data, but it is still impossible for the
dishonest party to derive the actual raw data of other parties.
Specifically, each party boosts a number of trees by exploit-
ing similarity information based on locality-sensitive hash-
ing. We prove that our framework is secure without expos-
ing the original record to other parties, while the computation
overhead in the training process is kept low. Our experimental
studies show that, compared with normal training with the lo-
cal data of each party, our approach can significantly improve
the predictive accuracy, and achieve comparable accuracy to
the original GBDT with the data from all parties.
1 Introduction
Federated learning (FL) (McMahan et al. 2016; Mirhoseini,
Sadeghi, and Koushanfar 2016; Shi et al. 2017; Yang et
al. 2019; Mohri, Sivek, and Suresh 2019; Li et al. 2019a)
has become a hot research area in machine learning. Fed-
erated learning addresses the privacy and security issues of
model training in multiple parties. In reality, data are dis-
persed over different areas. For example, people tend to go
to nearby hospitals, and the patient records in different hos-
pitals are isolated. Ideally, hospitals may benefit more if they
can collaborate with each other to train a model with the
joint data. However, due to the increasing concerns and more
regulations/policies on data privacy, organizations are not
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willing to share their own raw data records. Also, accord-
ing to a recent survey (Yang et al. 2019), federated learn-
ing can be broadly categorized into horizontal federated
learning, vertical federated learning and federated transfer
learning. Much research efforts have been devoted to de-
veloping new learning algorithms in the setting of vertical
or horizontal federated learning (Smith et al. 2017; Takabi,
Hesamifard, and Ghasemi 2016; Liu, Chen, and Yang 2018;
Yurochkin et al. 2019). We refer readers for more recent sur-
veys for details (Yang et al. 2019; Li et al. 2019a).
On the other hand, Gradient Boosting Decision Trees
(GBDTs) have become very successful in recent years by
winning many awards in machine learning and data min-
ing competitions (Chen and Guestrin 2016) as well as
their effectiveness in many applications (Richardson, Domi-
nowska, and Ragno 2007; Kim et al. 2009; Burges 2010;
Li et al. 2019b). There have been several recent studies on
how to train GBDTs in the federated learning setting (Cheng
et al. 2019; Liu et al. 2019; Zhao et al. 2018). For example,
SecureBoost (Cheng et al. 2019) developed vertical learning
with GBDTs. In contrast, this study focuses on horizontal
learning for GDBTs, where data samples with the same fea-
tures are distributed among multiple parties.
There have been several studies of GDBT training in the
setting of horizontal learning (Liu et al. 2019; Zhao et al.
2018). However, those approaches are not effective or effi-
cient enough for practical use.
Model accuracy: The learned model may not have a good
predictive accuracy. A recent study adopted differential pri-
vacy to aggregate distributed regression trees (Zhao et al.
2018). This approach boosts each tree only with the local
data, which does not utilize the information of data from
other parties. As we will show in the experiments, the model
accuracy is much lower than our proposed approach.
Efficiency: The approach (Liu et al. 2019) has a pro-
hibitively time-consuming learning process since it adopts
complex cryptographic methods to encrypt the data from
multiple parties. Due to a lot of extra cryptographic calcu-
lations, the approach brings prohibitively high overhead in
the training process. Moreover, since GBDTs have to tra-
verse the feature values to find the best split value, there is a
huge number of comparison operations even in the building
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of a single node.
Considering the previous approaches’ limitations on effi-
ciency and model accuracy, this study utilizes a more prac-
tical privacy model as a tradeoff between privacy and ef-
ficiency/model accuracy (Du, Han, and Chen 2004; Liu,
Chen, and Yang 2018). In this environment, a dishonest
party might obtain some information about the other par-
ties’ data, but it is still impossible for the dishonest party
to derive the actual raw data of other parties. Compared to
differential privacy or secret sharing, this privacy model is
weaker, but enables new opportunities for designing much
more efficient and effective GBDTs.
Specifically, we propose a novel and practical federated
learning framework for GDBTs (named SimFL). The ba-
sic idea is that instead of encryption on the feature values,
we make use of the similarity between data of different par-
ties in the training while protecting the raw data. First, we
propose the use of locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) in the
context of federated learning. We adopt LSH to collect sim-
ilarity information without exposing the raw data. Second,
we design a new approach called Weighted Gradient Boost-
ing (WGB), which can build the decision trees by exploiting
the similarity information with bounded errors. Our analysis
show that SimFL satisfies the privacy model (Du, Han, and
Chen 2004; Liu, Chen, and Yang 2018). The experimental
results show that SimFL shows a good accuracy, while the
training is fast for practical uses.
2 Preliminaries
Locality-Sensitive Hashing (LSH) LSH was first intro-
duced by Gionis et al. (1999) for approximate nearest neigh-
bor search. The main idea of LSH is to select a hashing func-
tion such that (1) the hash values of two neighbor points
are equal with a high probability and (2) the hash values of
two non-neighbor points are not equal with a high probabil-
ity. A good property of LSH is that there are infinite input
data for the same hash value. Thus, LSH has been used to
protect user privacy in applications such as keyword search-
ing (Wang et al. 2014) and recommendation systems (Qi et
al. 2017).
The previous study (Datar et al. 2004) proposed the p-
stable LSH family, which has been widely used. The hash
function Fa,b is formulated as Fa,b(v) = ba·v+br c, where
a is a d-dimensional vector with entries chosen indepen-
dently from a p-stable distribution (Zolotarev 1986); b is a
real number chosen uniformly from the range [0, r]; r is a
positive real number which represents the window size.
Gradient Boosting Decision Trees (GBDTs) The GBDT
is an ensemble model which trains a sequence of decision
trees. Formally, given a loss function l and a dataset with
n instances and d features D = {(xi, yi)}(|D| = n,xi ∈
Rd, yi ∈ R), GBDT minimizes the following objective func-
tion (Chen and Guestrin 2016).
L˜ =
∑
i
l(yˆi, yi) +
∑
k
Ω(fk) (1)
where Ω(f) = γTl + 12λ‖w‖2 is a regularization term to
penalize the complexity of the model. Here γ and λ are
hyper-parameters, Tl is the number of leaves and w is the
leaf weight. Each fk corresponds to a decision tree. Train-
ing the model in an additive manner, GBDT minimizes the
following objective function at the t-th iteration.
L˜(t) =
n∑
i=1
[gift(xi) +
1
2
hif
2
t (xi)] + Ω(ft) (2)
where gi = ∂yˆ(t−1) l(yi, yˆ(t−1)) and hi =
∂2
yˆ(t−1) l(yi, yˆ
(t−1)) are first and second order gradient
statistics on the loss function. The decision tree is built from
the root until reaching the restrictions such as the maximum
depth. Assume IL and IR are the instance sets of left and
right nodes after the split. Letting I = IL ∪ IR, the gain of
the split is given by
Lsplit = 1
2
[
(
∑
i∈IL gi)
2∑
i∈IL hi + λ
+
(
∑
i∈IR gi)
2∑
i∈IR hi + λ
− (
∑
i∈I gi)
2∑
i∈I hi + λ
]−γ
(3)
GBDT traverses all the feature values to find the split that
maximizes the gain.
3 Problem Statement
This paper focuses on the application scenarios of hori-
zontal federated learning. Multiple parties have their own
data which have the same set of features. Due to data pri-
vacy requirements, they are not willing to share their pri-
vate data with other parties. However, all parties want to ex-
ploit collaborations and benefits from a more accurate model
that can be built from the joint data from all parties. Thus,
the necessary incentive for this collaboration is that feder-
ated learning should generate a much better learned model
than the one generated from the local data of each party
alone. In other words, (much) better model accuracy is a
pre-condition for such collaborations in horizontal federated
learning. We can find such scenarios in various applications
such as banks and healthcares (Yang et al. 2019).
Specifically, we assume that there are M parties, and
each party is denoted by Pi (i ∈ [1,M ]). We use Im =
{(xmi , ymi )} (|Im| = Nm,xmi ∈ Rd, ymi ∈ R) to denote the
instance set of Pm. For simplicity, the instances have global
IDs that are unique identifiers among parties (i.e., given two
different instances xmi and x
n
j , we have i 6= j).
Privacy model. The previous study (Du, Han, and Chen
2004) proposed a 2-party security model, which is also
adopted in the previous studies (e.g., (Liu, Chen, and Yang
2018)). We extend the model for multiple parties, and we get
the following privacy definition.
Definition 1 (Privacy Model). Suppose all parties
are honest-but-curious. For a protocol C perform-
ing (O1, O2, ..., OM ) = C(I1, I2, ..., IM ), where
O1, O2, ..., OM are parties P1, P2, ..., PM ’s output and
I1, I2, ..., IM are their inputs, C is secure against P1 if there
exists infinite number of tuples (I ′2, ..., I
′
M , O
′
2, ..., O
′
M )
such that (O1, O′2, ..., O
′
M ) = C(I1, I
′
2, ..., I
′
M ).
Compared with the security definition in secure multi-
party computation (Yao 1982), the privacy model in Defi-
nition 1 is weaker in the privacy level, as also discussed in
the previous study (Du, Han, and Chen 2004). It does not
handle the potential risks such as inference attacks. For ex-
ample, it can happen that all the possible inputs for a certain
output are close to each other, enough information about the
input data may be disclosed (even though the exact informa-
tion for the input is unknown). However, how likely those at-
tacks can happen and its impact in real applications are still
to be determined. Thus, like the previous studies (Du, Han,
and Chen 2004; Liu, Chen, and Yang 2018), we view this
model as a heuristics model for privacy protection. More im-
portantly, with such a heuristic model, it is possible that we
develop practical federated learning models that are much
more efficient and have much higher accuracy than previous
approaches.
Problem definition. The objective is to build an efficient
and effective GBDT model under the privacy model in Def-
inition 1 over the instance set I =
⋃M
i=1 Ii (|I| = N).
4 The SimFL Framework
In this section, we introduce our framework, Similarity-
based Federated Learning (SimFL), which enables the train-
ing of GBDTs in a horizontally federated setting.
An Overview of SimFL There are two main stages in
SimFL: preprocessing and training. In practice, preprocess-
ing can be done once and reuse for many runs of training.
Only when the training data have updates, preprocessing
has to be performed. Figure 1 shows the structures of these
two stages. In the preprocessing stage, each party first com-
putes the hash values using randomly generated LSH func-
tions. Then, by collecting the hash values from LSH, multi-
ple global hash tables are built and broadcast to all the par-
ties, which can be modelled as an AllReduce communication
operation (Patarasuk and Yuan 2009). Finally, each party can
use the global hash tables for tree building without access-
ing other partys raw data. In the training stage, all parties
together train a number of trees one by one using the simi-
larity information. Once a tree is built in a party, it will be
sent to all the other parties for the update of gradients. We
obtain all the decision trees as the final learned model.
4.1 The Preprocessing Stage
For each instance, the aim of the preprocessing stage is to get
the IDs of similar instances of the other parties. Specifically,
for each party Pm, we want to get a matrix Sm ∈ RNm×M ,
where Smij is the ID of the instance in Party Pj that is similar
with xmi . To obtain the similarity of any two instances in the
joint data without exposing the raw data to the other parties,
we adopt the widely used p-stable LSH function (Datar et al.
2004). According to LSH, if two instances are similar, they
have a higher probability to be hashed to the same value.
Thus, by applying multiple LSH functions, the bigger the
number of identical hash values of two instances, the more
likely they are to be similar (Gionis et al. 1999).
Algorithm 1 shows the process of the preprocessing stage.
Given L randomly generated p-stable hash functions, each
party first computes the hash values of its instances. Then
we build L global hash tables using an AllReduce operation,
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Figure 1: An overview of the SimFL framework
which has been well studied in the previous study (Patarasuk
and Yuan 2009). Here the inputs to AllReduce are the in-
stance IDs and their hash values of all parties. The reduction
operation is to union the instances IDs with the same hash
value. We adopt the bandwidth optimal and contention free
design from the previous study (Patarasuk and Yuan 2009).
After broadcasting the hash tables, each party can compute
the similarity information. Specifically, in party Pm, given
an instance xmi , the similar instance in the other party Pj
is the one with the highest count of identical hash values.
If there are multiple instances with the same highest count,
we randomly choose one as the similar instance. In this way,
the data distribution of the other parties can be learned by
adopting our weighted gradient boosting strategy, which we
will show next.
4.2 The Training Stage
In the training stage, each party trains a number of trees
sequentially. When party Pm is training a tree, to protect
the individual records of other parties, only the local in-
stances Im are used to learn the tree. The learned trees are
shared among the parties during the training process. To ex-
ploit the similarity information between the instances from
different parties, we propose a new approach to build the
decision tree, which is called Weighted Gradient Boosting
(WGB). The basic idea is that an instance is important and
representative if it is similar to many other instances. Since
the gradients can represent the importance of an instance
as shown in the previous studies (Chen and Guestrin 2016;
Ke et al. 2017), we propose to use weighted gradients in the
training. Next, we describe WGB in detail.
The Weighted Gradient Boosting Approach For an in-
stance xmq ∈ Im, let Wnmq = {k|Snkm = q}, which contains
the IDs of the instances in In that are similar with xmq . Let
gmq and h
m
q denote the first order and second order gradients
of loss function at xmq , respectively. When Pm is building a
Algorithm 1: The preprocessing stage
Input: LSH functions {Fk}k=1,2...L, Instance set I
Output: The similarity matrices S
1 for each party Pm do
/* Conduct on party Pm */
2 for each instance xmi ∈ Im do
3 Compute hash values {Fk(xmi )}k=1,2...L;
4 Building and broadcasting global hash tables by
AllReduce;
5 for m← 1 to M do
/* Conduct on party Pm */
6 for each instance xmi ∈ Im do
7 for j = 1 to M do
/* Collect similar instance IDs of Pj */
8 if j 6= m then
9 Find the instance ID t with the highest
count of identical hash values;
10 Smij ← t;
11 else
/* In the same party, the most similar
instance is itself */
12 Smij ← i;
new tree at the t-th iteration, WGB minimizes the following
objective function.
L˜(t)w =
∑
xmq ∈Im
[Gmqft(x
m
q ) +
1
2
Hmqf
2
t (x
m
q )] + Ω(ft)
where Gmq =
∑
n
∑
i∈Wnmq
gni ,Hmq =
∑
n
∑
i∈Wnmq
hni
(4)
Compared with the objective in Eq. (2), Eq. (4) only uses
the instances of Im. Instead of using the gradients gmq , h
m
q of
the instance xmq , we useGmq,Hmq which are the sum of the
gradients of the instances that are similar with xmq (including
xmq itself). To help understanding, here is an example. Sup-
pose we have two parties Pa and Pb. When computing the
similarity information for a party Pa, the similar instance for
both xa1 and x
a
2 may be x
b
3. Then, when building trees in Pb,
the gradient of xb3 is replaced by the aggregated gradients
of xa1 , x
a
2 , and x
b
3. Considering Gmq,Hmq as weighted gra-
dients, we put more weights on instances that have a larger
number of similar instances to utilize the similarity informa-
tion.
Since the process of building a tree is similar between dif-
ferent parties, we only describe the process of building a
tree in Party Pm, which is shown in Algorithm 2. At first,
the parties update the gradients of the local instances. Then,
for each instance of Pm, the other parties compute and send
the aggregated gradients of the similar instances. Instead of
sending each gradient directly, such aggregation on the lo-
cal party can reduce the communication cost and protect
the individual gradients. After all the aggregated gradients
are computed and send to Pm, the weighted gradients can
Algorithm 2: The process of learning a tree
Input: Instance set I
Output: A new decision tree
1 for i = 1 to M , i 6= m do
/* Conduct on party Pi */
2 Gim∗ ← 0, Him∗ ← 0;
3 Update the gradients of instances in Ii;
4 for each instance xiq ∈ Ii do
5 Get the similar instance ID s = Siqm;
6 Gims ← Gims + giq , Hims ← Gims + hiq;
7 Send Gim∗, H
i
m∗ to Pm;
/* Conduct on party Pm */
8 Update the gradients of instances in Im;
9 for each instance xmq ∈ Im do
10 Gmq ← 0, Hmq ← 0;
11 for i← 1 to M do
12 if i == m then
13 Gmq ← Gmq + gmq ;
14 Hmq ← Hmq + hmq ;
15 else
16 Gmq ← Gmq +Gimq;
17 Hmq ← Hmq +Himq;
18 Build a tree with instances Im and weighted gradients
Gm∗, Hm∗;
19 Send the tree to the other parties;
be easily computed by summing the aggregated gradients.
Then, we can build a tree based on the weighted gradients.
5 Theoretical Analysis
5.1 Privacy Level Analysis
Theorem 1. The SimFL protocol satisfies the privacy model
definition if L < d, where L is the number of hash functions
and d is the number of dimensions of training data.
In short, there are infinite number of solutions if the num-
ber of unknowns (i.e., d) is bigger than the number of equa-
tions (i.e., L) (Ladyzhenskaia, Solonnikov, and Ural’ceva
1968). The detailed proof is available in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 indicates that, when L < d, SimFL ensures
that, for any its output, there exists an infinite number of pos-
sible inputs resulting the same output. Therefore, a dishonest
party cannot determine the actual raw data from other par-
ties. Potentially, there may be background knowledge attack
against SimFL. An optional method to resolve this problem
is to decrease L to get a fewer number of equations, which
results in a larger number of inputs for the same output. For
example, if we know the background knowledge of a feature
and now we only have (d − 1) unknowns, we can set L to
(d−2) or even smaller to ensure that the raw data still cannot
be extracted.
5.2 The Error of Weighted Gradient Boosting
Here we analyze the approximation error as well as the gen-
eralization error of WGB.
Theorem 2. For simplicity, we assume that the feature val-
ues of each dimension are i.i.d. uniform random variables
and the split value is randomly chosen from the feature val-
ues. Suppose Pm is learning a new tree. We denote the
approximation error of WGB as εt = |L˜(t)w − L˜(t)|. Let
dt = maxr,j‖xmSjrm − x
j
r‖1, dm = maxi,j‖xi − xj‖1,
g′ = maxi |gi|, h′ = maxi |hi|, and f ′t = maxi |ft(xi)|.
Then, with probability at least 1− δ, we have
εt ≤
(
[1− (1− dt
dm
)D](N −Nm) +
√
(N −Nm) ln 1δ
2
)
· (2g′f ′t +
1
2
h′f ′2t )
(5)
where D is the depth of the tree, N is the number of in-
stances in I , and Nm is the number of instances in Im.
The detailed proof of Theorem 2 is available in Appendix
B. According to Theorem 2, the upper bound of the approx-
imation error is O(N −Nm) with respect to the number of
instances. The approximation error of WGB may increase
as the number of instances of the other parties increases.
However, let us consider the generalization error of WGB,
which can be formulated as εWGBgen (t) = |L˜(t)w − L˜(t)∗ | ≤
|L˜(t)w −L˜(t)|+ |L˜(t)−L˜(t)∗ | , εt + εgen(t). The generaliza-
tion error of vanilla GBDTs (i.e., εgen(t)) tends to decrease
as the number of training instances N increases (Shalev-
Shwartz and Ben-David 2014). Thus, WGB may still have
a low generalization error as N increases.
5.3 Computation and Communication Efficiency
Here we analyze the computation and communication over-
head of SimFL. Suppose we have T tress,M parties,N total
training instances, and L hash functions.
Computation Overhead (1) In the preprocessing stage,
we first need to compute the hash values, which costs
O(Nd). Then, we need to union the instance IDs with the
same hash value and compute the similarity information.
The union operation can be done in O(NL) since we have
to traverse NL hash values in total. When computing the
similarity information for an instance xmi , a straightforward
method is to union the instance IDs of L buckets with hash
values {Fk(xmi )}k=1,2...L and conduct linear search to find
the instance ID with the maximum frequency. On average,
each hash bucket has a constant number of instances. Thus,
for each instance, the linear search can be done in O(L).
Thus, the total computation overhead in the preprocessing
stage is O(NL+Nd) on average.
(2) In the training stage, the process of building a tree
is the same as the vanilla GBDTs except computing the
weighted gradients. The calculation of the weighted gra-
dients is done by simple sum operations, which is O(N).
Then, the computation overhead is O(NT ) in the training.
Communication Overhead Suppose each real number
uses 4 bytes to store. (1) In the preprocessing stage, accord-
ing to the previous study (Patarasuk and Yuan 2009), since
we haveNL hash values and the corresponding instance IDs
to share, the total communication cost in the AllReduce op-
eration is 8MNL bytes. (2) In the training stage, each party
has to send the aggregated gradients. The size of the gradi-
ents is no more than 8N (including g and h). After building a
tree, Pm has to send the tree to the other parties. Suppose the
depth of each tree is D. Our implementation uses 8 bytes to
store the split value and the feature ID of each node. There-
fore, the size of a tree is 8(2D − 1). Since each tree has to
be sent to (M − 1) parties, the communication cost for one
tree is 8(2D − 1)(M − 1). The total communication over-
head for a tree is 8[N + (2D − 1)(M − 1)]. Since there are
T trees, the communication overhead in the training stage is
8T [N + (2D − 1)(M − 1)].
6 Experiments
We present the effectiveness and efficiency of SimFL. To un-
derstand the model accuracy of SimFL, we compare SimFL
with two approaches: 1) SOLO: Each party only trains
vanilla GBDTs with its local data. This comparison shows
the incentives of using SimFL. 2) ALL-IN: A party trains
vanilla GBDTs with the joint data from all parties without
the concern of privacy. This comparison demonstrates the
potential accuracy loss of achieving the privacy model. We
also compare SimFL with the distributed boosting frame-
work proposed by Zhao et al. (2018) (referred as TFL (Tree-
based Federated Learning)). Here we only adopt their frame-
work and do not add any noise in the training (their system
also adds noises to training for differential privacy).
We conducted the experiments on a machine running
Linux with two Xeon E5-2640v4 10 core CPUs, 256GB
main memory and a Tesla P100 GPU of 12GB memory.
To take advantage of GPU, we use ThunderGBM (Wen et
al. 2019) in our study. We use six public datasets from the
LIBSVM website1, as listed in Table 1. We use 75% of the
datasets for training and the remainder for testing. The max-
imum depth of the trees is set to 8. For the LSH functions,
we choose r = 4.0 and L = min{40, d − 1}, where d is
the dimension of the dataset. The total number of trees is set
to 500 in all approaches. Due to the randomness of the LSH
functions, the results of SimFL may differ in the different
runnings. We run SimFL for 10 times in each experiment
and report the average, minimal and maximum errors.
In reality, the distribution of the data in different parties
may vary. For example, due to the ozone hole, the coun-
tries in the Southern Hemisphere may have more skin can-
cer patients than the Northern Hemisphere. Thus, like a pre-
vious work (Yurochkin et al. 2019), we consider two ways
to divide the training dataset to simulate different data dis-
tributions in the federated setting: unbalanced partition and
balanced partition. In the unbalanced partition, we divide
the datasets with two classes (i.e., 0 and 1) to subsets where
each subset has a relatively large proportion of the instances
1https://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/∼cjlin/libsvm/index.html
Table 1: datasets used in the experiments
dataset cardinality dimension data size
a9a 32,561 123 16MB
cod-rna 59,535 9 2.1MB
real-sim 72,309 20,958 6.1GB
ijcnn1 49,990 22 4.4MB
SUSY 1,000,000 18 72MB
HIGGS 1,000,000 28 112MB
Table 2: The test errors of different approaches (θ = 80%)
datasets SimFL TFL SOLOA SOLOB ALL-INavg min max
a9a 17.0% 16.7% 17.2% 23.1% 19.1% 22.0% 15.1%
cod-rna 6.5% 6.3% 6.7% 7.5% 9.6% 8.2% 6.13%
real-sim 8.3% 8.2% 8.4% 10.1% 11.8% 14.4% 6.5%
ijcnn1 4.5% 4.5% 4.6% 4.7% 5.9% 4.9% 3.7%
SUSY 23.3% 23.1 % 23.4% 32.6% 25.4% 32.8 % 21.38%
HIGGS 30.9% 30.8% 31.0% 36.1% 37.1% 35.6% 29.4%
in one class. Given a ratio θ ∈ (0, 1), we randomly sam-
ple θ proportion of the instances that are with the class 0 and
(1−θ) proportion of the instances that are with the class 1 to
form a subset, and the remained for the other subset. Then,
we can split these two subsets to more parts equally and ran-
domly to simulate more parties. In the balanced partition,
we simply split the datasets equally and randomly assign the
instances to different parties.
6.1 Test Errors
We first divide the datasets into two parts using the unbal-
anced partition with the ratio θ = 80%, and assign them to
two parties A and B . The test errors are shown in Table 2.
We have the following observations. First, the test errors of
SimFL are always lower than SOLO on data parts A and
B (denoted as SOLOA and SOLOB respectively). The accu-
racy can be improved by about 4% on average by performing
SimFL. Second, the test error of SimFL is close to ALL-IN.
Third, Compared with TFL, SimFL has much lower test er-
rors. The test errors of TFL are always bigger than SOLO,
which discourages the adoptions of TFL in practice. In other
words, TFL’s approach on aggregating decision trees from
multiple parties cannot improve the prediction of the local
data of individual parties.
To figure out the impact of the ratio θ, we conduct ex-
periments with different ratios that range from 60% to 90%.
The results are shown in Figure 2. Compared with TFL and
SOLO, SimFL works quite well especially when θ is high.
The similarity information can effectively help to discover
Table 3: The test errors of different approaches (balanced
partition)
datasets SimFL TFL SOLOA SOLOB ALL-INavg min max
a9a 15.1% 14.9% 15.2% 15.6% 15.5% 15.9% 15.1%
cod-rna 6.0% 5.9% 6.1% 6.3% 6.4% 6.7% 6.1%
real-sim 7.1% 6.9% 7.2% 7.4% 8.4% 7.9% 6.5%
ijcnn1 3.6% 3.5% 3.7% 3.8% 3.8% 4.2% 3.7%
SUSY 19.6% 19.4% 19.9% 20.2% 20.1% 20.1% 20.0%
HIGGS 29.3% 29.2% 29.5% 31.4% 30.2% 30.5% 29.3%
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Figure 2: The test error with different ratio θ
the distribution of the joint data among multiple parties. The
variation of SimFL is low in multiple runs.
Table 3 shows the errors with the setting of the balanced
partition. It seems that for the six datasets, the local data in
each party is good enough to train the model. The test errors
of SOLO and ALL-IN are very close to each other. However,
our SimFL still performs better than SOLO and TFL, and
sometimes even has a lower test error than ALL-IN. Even in
a balanced partition, SimFL still has a good performance.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the test errors with different
number of parties. The ratio θ is set to 80% for the unbal-
anced partition. As the number of parties increases, accord-
ing to Section 5.2, the upper bound of the generalization er-
ror of SimFL may increase since N is fixed and (N −Nm)
increases, which agrees with the experimental results. Still,
SimFL has a lower test error than the minimal error of SOLO
at most times. While the test error of TFL changes dramat-
ically as the number of parties increases, SimFL is much
more stable in both balanced and unbalanced data partition.
6.2 Efficiency
To show the training time efficiency of SimFL, we present
the time and communication cost in the training stage and
the preprocessing stage (denoted as prep) in Table 4. The
number of parties is set to 10 and we adopt a balanced par-
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Figure 3: The impact of number of parties (θ = 80%)
tition here. First, we can observe that the training time of
SimFL is very close to SOLO. The computation overhead
is less than 10% of the total training time. Second, since
SimFL only needs the local instances to build a tree while
ALL-IN needs all the instances, the training time of SimFL
is smaller than ALL-IN. Moreover, the proprecessing over-
head is acceptable since it may only be required to perform
once and reused for future training. One common scenario
is that a user may try many runs of training with different
hyper parameter settings and the pre-processing cost can be
amortized among those runs. Last, the communication over-
head per tree is very low, which costs no more than 10MB.
In the encryption methods (Liu et al. 2019), since additional
keys need to be transferred, their communicated data size
per tree can be much larger than ours.
7 Conclusions
The success of federated learning highly relies on the train-
ing time efficiency and the accuracy of the learned model.
However, we find that existing horizontal federated learning
systems of GBDTs suffer from low efficiency and/or low
model accuracy. Based on an established relaxed privacy
model, we propose a practical federated learning frame-
work SimFL for GBDTs by exploiting similarity. We take
advantage of efficient locality-sensitive hashing to collect
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Figure 4: The impact of number of parties (balanced parti-
tion)
the similarity information without exposing the individual
records, in contrast of costly secret sharing/encryption oper-
ations in previous studies. By designing a weighted gradient
boosting method, we can utilize the similarity information
to build decision trees with bounded errors. We prove that
SimFL satisfies the privacy model. The experiments show
that SimFL significantly improves the predictive accuracy
compared with training with data in individual parties alone,
and is close to the model with joint data from all parties.
Table 4: The training time (sec), preprocessing time (sec),
communication cost (MB) per party in the preprocessing and
communication cost (MB) per tree in the training.
datasets
ALL-IN SOLO SimFL
training
time
training
time
time communication
training prep training prep
a9a 21.6 15.2 17.2 135 0.28 10.4
cod-rna 24.7 16.3 17.9 189 0.49 4.3
real-sim 69.5 32.4 34.5 380 0.6 23.1
ijcnn1 29.3 15.7 17.4 228 0.42 8.4
SUSY 204.1 34.6 43.1 963 8.0 136
HIGGS 226.6 39.8 44.8 996 8.0 216
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Without loss of generality, we only need to prove that
the protocol is secure against Pm. In the whole FL process,
Pm knows the hash values of the other instances and the
aggregated gradients of the similar instances. Next, we prove
that there are infinite number of instances that can provide
the same hash values and gradients.
Given the hash values, Pm knows L different compound
inequalities about an instance xk with the form Fj(xk) ≤
aj ·xk+bj
r < Fj(xk) + 1, j = 1..L. Consider a stricter sys-
tem of L different linear equations aj ·xk+bjr = zj , where
zj ∈ [Fj(xk),Fj(xk) + 1). Obviously, for a linear system,
there are no solution or an infinite number of solutions if
the number of unknowns (i.e., d) is bigger than the num-
ber of equations (i.e., L) (Ladyzhenskaia, Solonnikov, and
Ural’ceva 1968). Since we already know there is at least one
solution (i.e., xk), the number of solutions is infinite. Thus,
there are infinite number of instances that can result in the
same hash values that Pm knows. Since the gradients are
computed based on the prediction values, the instances can
provide the same gradient as long as they have the same pre-
diction values in the trees. Note that the restrictions in the
decision trees only specify a range of the feature values. So
we have infinite number of instances that can provide the
same gradients as long as they satisfy the same restrictions
on the features values and are divided into the same leaf.
Thus, we can have infinite number of instances that can pro-
vide the same output for party Pm.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. For ease of presentation, we suppose the instances
have different globally IDs (i.e., for any two instances xmi
and xnj , if m 6= n then i 6= j). Thus, we can use gi instead
of gmi to denote the first order gradient of an instance x
m
i .
Also, we use hi instead of hmi to denote the second order
gradient of xmi . We have
L˜(t) =
n∑
i=1
[gift(xi) +
1
2
hif
2
t (xi)] + Ω(ft)
=
∑
xmq ∈Im
[gqft(x
m
q ) +
1
2
hqf
2
t (x
m
q )]
+
M∑
j=1
j 6=m
∑
xjr∈Ij
[grft(x
j
r) +
1
2
hrf
2
t (x
j
r)] + Ω(ft)
(6)
With Eq. (4), we have
L˜(t) = L˜(t)w −
M∑
j=1
j 6=m
∑
r
xjr∈Ij
[grft(x
m
Sjrm
) +
1
2
hrf
2
t (x
m
Sjrm
)]
+
M∑
j=1
j 6=m
∑
xjr∈Ij
[grft(x
j
r) +
1
2
hrf
2
t (x
j
r)]
= L˜(t)w −
M∑
j=1
j 6=m
∑
r
xjr∈Ij
[gr(ft(x
m
Sjrm
)− ft(xjr))
+
1
2
hr(f
2
t (x
m
Sjrm
)− f2t (xjr))]
(7)
Thus, we have
εt = |L˜(t)w − L˜(t)|
=
M∑
j=1
j 6=m
∑
r
xjr∈Ij
|gr(ft(xmSjrm)− ft(x
j
r))
+
1
2
hr(f
2
t (x
m
Sjrm
)− f2t (xjr))|
(8)
Let ξr = |gr(ft(xmSjrm) − ft(x
j
r)) +
1
2hr(f
2
t (x
m
Sjrm
) −
f2t (x
j
r))|. Since g′ = maxi |gi|, h′ = maxi |hi|, and f ′t =
maxi |ft(xi)|, we have
ξr ≤ 2g′f ′t +
1
2
h′f ′2t (9)
Notice that ξr = 0 if xmSjrm and x
j
r go to the same leaf of
the tree ft. According to our assumption, the feature values
of each feature are i.i.d. uniform random variables and the
split value is randomly chosen from the feature values. Let
dt = maxr,j‖xmSjrm − x
j
r‖1 and dm = maxi,j‖xi − xj‖1,
then the probability that xm
Sjrm
and xjr are divided into two
directions in each node is smaller than dtdm (i.e., the proba-
bility that randomly drop a ball in a line with length dm and
it falls in a interval with length dt). Let D denotes the depth
of the tree. Then, the probability that xm
Sjrm
and xjr go to the
same leaf is bigger than (1 − dtdm )D. There are (N − Nm)
different ξr. Let H denotes the nubmer of times that ξr 6= 0.
By Hoeffding’s inequality with a Bernoulli distribution, with
probability at least 1− δ, we have
H ≤ [1−(1− dt
dm
)D](N−Nm)+
√
(N −Nm) ln 1δ
2
(10)
With Eq. (9) and Eq. (10), we have
εt ≤
(
[1− (1− dt
dm
)D](N −Nm) +
√
(N −Nm) ln 1δ
2
)
· (2g′f ′t +
1
2
h′f ′2t )
(11)
